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1 Introduction
The dissolution of a whole political system (socialism) and its integration into 
another system (capitalism) is a very extreme form of social change and, 
obviously, a very drastic cause for severe political turbulence. It is often over-
looked that these integration processes have caused significant changes not 
only in East Germany, but also in West German society and its differentiated 
subsystems. Undoubtedly, the transformation proceeding the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989 has threatened both the stability and the legitimation of the West 
German research system more than any other event since World War II. For 
not only has this process opened up many new opportunities for the focal 
actors, which include the federal government, the federal states and the Ger-
man research organizations such as the Max Planck Society, the Fraunhofer 
Society or the National Research Centers1 -  it has also produced social 
threats. Now we can see that the opportunities these research organizations 
had to expand in the East went hand in hand with financial cutbacks and the 
delegitimation of their previous research programs. This is especially true for 
the National Research Centers.
But there is another reason why the National Research Centers in Ger-
many represent a very instructive case of politically induced trouble. As op-
1 We prefer the term “National Research Centers” rather than “Big Science Centers” 
because it corresponds more accurately with the official terminology of the centers 
themselves and the ministry to which they belong. Nevertheless, the historical identity 
and organizational development of the centers is based on “Big Science” in the field 
of nuclear energy.
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posed to other research organizations, they were “caught” by German unifica-
tion in a “double trouble” situation. The National Research Centers had been 
suffering from political trouble since the mid-1970s and were just recovering 
when the unforseen event of German unification threw them into a new, 
turbulent situation. It is ironic that the National Research Centers were just 
beginning to cope successfully with their existing trouble when they encoun-
tered the challenge of German unification requiring additional new coping 
efforts. This type of coincidental2 trouble situation resulting from the conver-
gence of two different sources of trouble makes the National Research Centers 
an interesting case study of coping with trouble.
From a theoretical point of view, the National Research Centers provide 
a good example for the interplay and the interdependence of different levels 
of actors. Analytically, we can distinguish four levels of action: the individ-
ual researcher, the project group or institute as a part of a National Research 
Center, the entire National Research Center and, finally, the Association of 
National Research Centers. One of our main goals is to answer the question 
(from a strategic as well as theoretical point of view) of how coping activi-
ties on one of these levels cause -  sometimes intended, sometimes 
unintended -  effects on other action levels.
By examining national research in Germany from this particular perspec-
tive, we hope to gain greater insight into how scientific actors respond to 
serious and sudden changes in their political environment. Taking for granted 
that the growing dependence of the scientific subsystem on the political sub-
system is an irreversible result of evolution during this century,3 we must 
systematically question the strategic capacity of science in modem societies. 
Therefore, I would like to contribute to an institutional perspective on science 
using multilevel actor constellations as an analytical focus from which to 
study strategic action problems of science.
Regarding the research methods employed, it is important to note that the 
case of the National Research Centers in Western Germany represents an 
ongoing social process which became dynamic in mid-1991. In contrast to 
many case studies in this book dealing with “histories” which can be consid-
ered complete, the events connected with this case can still be observed. We
2 The term “coincidental” means the “convergence of two independent causal series” as 
Boudon (1986: 175) puts it. Cf. also Schimank (1988).
3 Cf. the introduction by Schimank and Stucke in this volume.
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can collect data from the past and the present, and guess how the future will 
develop.4 Therefore, we can only offer limited observations of real coping 
activities now, but think it is justified, and might even be fruitful, to speculate 
scientifically about the future coping of national research actors and the side 
effects it may have.
Such observations will help to answer these questions in the following 
sections. 2: Why has German Unification not only offered good opportunities 
but actually caused trouble for the West German research system? 3: Why 
are the National Research Centers in West Germany much more susceptible 
to this form of trouble than other types of research organizations? 4: What 
are -  or might be -  the coping efforts of the different actors at the different 
levels within the National Research sector? And what are the (mostly unin-
tended) effects of the interplay between different levels of coping activities?
2 German Unification: Good Opportunities and Increasing 
Trouble for the West German Research System
It was not obvious that German unification would create a troublesome situa-
tion for the well-established West German research system. International 
observers, in particular, might think that the term “political trouble” more 
aptly describes the total restructuring of the East German science system, 
which lost its institutional basis and half of its personnel through the unifica-
tion process.5 Nevertheless, it is not just a peevish complaint when Western 
actors consider their own situation to be troublesome within the framework 
of German unification. To understand this, we must distinguish between two 
main stages of the unification process: a first stage of basic decision making, 
which lasted from early spring of 1990 to the date of unification, 3 October 
1990 and a second stage of implementation -  i.e. making unification actually 
work -  which is still going on. Unquestionably, the actors of the West Ger-
4 My empirical data consists of official and unofficial documents, and interviews with the 
managing directors of some National Research Centers and with officials from the re-
search ministries at the federal and state level. In order to guarantee the anonymity of 
the experts, I can only name the organizations from which the information originates.
5 For more detail, see the contributions by Mayntz and by Wolf in this volume.
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man research system prevailed from a legal point of view in the first stage, 
having succeeded in upholding their position that nothing should be changed 
in the West after unification, and that East German science would have to 
adapt to the established West German structures (cf. Mayntz 1991; Stucke 
1992). But they failed to anticipate that this policy aimed at preserving the 
institutional status quo could not avert massive and substantial repercussions 
in the West German science organizations during the second stage, which led, 
in turn, to a new and unforeseen troublesome situation for themselves.
In the first stage, in the winter of 1989/1990, some of the science organi-
zations were motivated by special interests, and some were simply guided 
by organizational indifference to the processes in East Germany. It is not 
surprising that the market-oriented Fraunhofer Society6 was the first German 
science organization to present a concept for cooperation with East German 
institutes and to establish joint ventures with East German scientists. Neither 
is it surprising, however, that the National Research Centers in Germany 
reacted to the incentives of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology 
(Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie, BMFT) to expand in 
East Germany. Having gone through a difficult period in which it had to 
suffer with criticism from many sides,7 “Big Science” viewed unification 
as a unique opportunity to enhance its scientific reputation. Various types of 
cooperation with East German scientists and institutes were built up, especial-
ly by National Research Centers working in the fields of high-energy physics, 
cancer therapy, biotechnology and informatics. Despite the existence of indi-
vidual contacts between individual scientists, there was not as much coopera-
tion in the classic fields of Big Science, nuclear energy and space technology. 
The German Research Foundation (the largest science-promoting agency in 
Germany) and the Max Planck Society, on the other hand, reacted cautiously 
to the expectations regarding cooperation with East German science organiza-
tions. Both organizations hesitated because of their limited budgets and be-
cause they did not have enough information about the scientific and techno-
logical quality of the East German institutes.
6 The Fraunhofer Society conducts applied research in cooperation with state organizations 
and industry. Most of its institutes are self-financing, drawing on their own profits from 
contract research for firms and for the government.
7 For more details see Section 3 below, and Hohn/ Schimank (1990: 233-297).
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This period of cooperation ended in March 1990 when Lothar de Maiziere 
(a Christian Democrat supported by the West German Christian Democratic 
Union) won the general election in East Germany and an immediate unifica-
tion of both states dominated the political agenda. In the early spring of 1990, 
the immediate and direct unification of the two German states became more 
and more probable. At this time, the BMFT, which finances 90% of the insti-
tutional promotion of the centers, stopped the cooperation activities of the 
National Research Centers in the East, fearing that the expansion of an expen-
sive type of research organization would have repercussions in its own budget. 
Gradually, the National Research Centers began to see the process of unifica-
tion in a completely different light. The phase in which changes had seemed 
to offer good opportunities gave way to one in which defense of the status 
quo took priority over all else on the political agenda of West German science 
organizations.
In April and May of 1990 at the latest, the actors of the West German 
research system had to start preparing for German unification. Two questions 
became increasingly important: What kind of institutional science structures 
would be desirable in a united Germany? What legal and administrative pro-
cedures would be needed to establish these all-German institutional structures? 
At this time, all the western science organizations were interested in prevent-
ing the emergence of a separate science structure in East Germany after unifi-
cation. Despite many diverging interests, they converged at a shared first-
order goal: the defense of their respective domains. The federal government, 
the federal states and the science organizations arrived at the consensus that 
the institutional status quo should be protected. Specifically, this meant that 
the West German actors agreed to maintain the federal structure in an all-Ger-
man science system. The decisive question of what consequences the estab-
lishment of five new states in a united Germany would have for the future 
of cooperative federalism within the area of science policy was completely 
neglected at this time. The federal government, the federal states and the 
science organizations were content to emphasize federalism and the joint 
promotion of science as a formal principle.
The formal organizational structure of the all-German science system was 
a more critical question between the three actor groups, but they finally man-
aged to agree on this, too. In June and July of 1990, the BMFT adopted the 
position of the West German science organizations completely. The establish-
ment of new GDR structures and the consolidation of the old ones was to
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be avoided, and there was to be “only one German Research Foundation, one 
Max Planck Society and one Fraunhofer Society.” The West German actors 
neglected to consider the substantial consequences of integrating the former 
GDR institutes and scientists into the existing West German science system, 
being satisfied once again to proclaim that nothing was to be changed. To 
implement the transition of the East German science system, the West German 
Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat) was commissioned to evaluate all extra-
university institutes in East Germany with regard to their scientific perfor-
mance (cf. Krull 1992; Simon 1992). Those which were evaluated positively 
were to be integrated into the appropriate West German science organizations, 
while those evaluated negatively were to be completely dissolved.
Hence, the strategy of the major West German actors with regard to the 
formal negotiations on the unification treaty became clear:
1. The East German Academy of Sciences would only be temporarily main-
tained.
2. All East German institutes which were evaluated positively would be 
integrated into the West German science structure.
3. The new East German states would join the West German “Agreement 
on the Promotion of Science” (Rahmenvereinbarung Forschungsforde-
rung) between the federal government and the states.
This interest in preserving the status quo was sanctioned, finally, by Article 
38 of the German Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag), which went into 
effect on the date of German unification, 3 October 1990 (Einigungsvertrag 
1990: 902). By the end of 1990, it seemed that a definite winner in the unifi-
cation process had emerged: the West German science system. It had success-
fully preserved its institutional structures, while the East German science 
system, on the other hand, had been completely dissolved.8 9
During 1991, it became increasingly evident that the unification process 
in science would be more than a mere formal integration of some East Ger-
man scientists into the well-known West German structure. In mid-1991, the
8 The corresponding extrauniversity science organization in East Germany was the Acad-
emy of Sciences with 24,000 employees (cf. Glaser 1992).
9 The mere transfer of institutions from West to East is one typical pattern of German 
unification in all policy areas (cf. Lehmbruch 1993).
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Science Council finished its evaluations and recommendations on East Ger-
man science, so that new centers, institutes or project groups could be estab-
lished in the five new states in the East. In that context, three new National 
Research Centers were founded in former East Germany in 1992: the Geo-
scientific Research Center Potsdam, the Max Delbrück Center for Molecular 
Medicine in Berlin-Buch and the Center for Environmental Research Leipzig-
Halle. In fact, German unification opened up good opportunities for some 
East German scientists and institutes that had repercussions within the West 
German science system.
As early as 1991, however, the federal government was pressed by a 
growing national debt resulting from German unification. Consequently, the 
government proclaimed a political principle of “establishing and developing 
[institutions] in the East before expanding in the West,” so that a new, unan-
ticipated trouble situation for the Western science system emerged. Three 
interrelated dimensions of this trouble can be distinguished: a financial, a 
social and a programmatic one. The financial dimension is illustrated by the 
fact that the institutional basis of the extrauniversity sector in Germany after 
unification increased by about 20%, while the budget of the BMFT increased 
only about 10% (Meske 1992). This forced the BMFT to “rob the West to 
pay the East.” Now we have a zero-sum game in Germany in which new 
institutes and groups in East Germany are financed mainly by cutbacks in 
the West.
The scarcity of public resources has led in the social dimension to increas-
ing competition between institutes in the East and the West, and among the 
Western science organizations themselves. Every science organization in the 
West is trying to use its strategic power and reputation to avoid financial 
losses and, consequently, to keep open its options for realizing its own scien-
tific programs in the future. According to the “Matthew effect,” the institutes 
and research organizations with good reputations are better off in such times 
of redistribution, while those with image problems -  like the National Re-
search Centers, which had been the subject of criticism for 15 years -  are 
at a relative disadvantage.
Social competition calls forth not only competition for scarce resources, 
but also competition to preserve the established program areas an institute 
wishes to maintain. Hence we can expect competition between East German 
and West German institutes struggling to be more successful in certain re-
search areas in the future. Since political actors will undoubtedly try to reduce
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redundant capacities in specific program areas, West German institutes will 
be forced either to face a process of substantial reorientation, or to vanish 
from the research scene.10 Therefore, we may expect increasing problems 
of acceptance and legitimation for the West German research organizations.
All West German science organizations are confronted with varying de-
grees of these three types of trouble. But the National Research Centers are 
in a specific dilemma which has to do with their precarious status in the past.
3 National Science Centers under Political Pressure
The National Research Centers were “caught” by German unification during 
an important stage of programmatic reorientation. This reorientation was 
necessary after years of debates on the future of Big Science in Germany and 
strong pressure from the political actors on the centers to orient themselves 
toward new and challenging areas of science and technology. To understand 
this extreme political pressure on the thirteen National Research Centers in 
West Germany, one must know that the two largest ones (Kernforschungs- 
anlage Jillicit and Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe) were founded between 
1955 and 1960 for the purpose of conducting research in the field of nuclear 
energy.11 When some of the basic research programs of these centers came 
to an end, the federal government had a problem: Closing the centers was 
impossible because of the interests of the federal states in “their” National 
Research Centers. Moreover, the personnel could not be substituted by a 
younger team of scientists with the know-how necessary for programmatic 
reorientation, because most of the positions in National Research Centers are 
permanent, leaving the management little flexibility regarding personnel mat-
10 The foundation of the Center for Environmental Research Leipzig-Halle, for example, 
might be seen by several of the western National Research Centers as a direct threat 
to their own projects in the field of environmental research.
11 It must also be emphasized that these centers were “creations” of the former Federal 
Ministry for Atomic Energy. This ministry was able to considerably enhance its own 
political importance in the field of research policy by founding the centers (cf. Stucke 
1993: 141-161). 90% of the institutional promotion is provided by the federal govern-
ment, 10% by the respective federal states in which the centers are located.
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ters. Nevertheless, considerable political pressure was brought to bear on the 
National Research Centers during the seventies. They were urged to look for 
new application-oriented research programs which would provide an adequate 
basis for cooperation with other sectors, especially with industry (Hohn/ Schi- 
mank 1990: 233-297). This concept of technology transfer failed partly be-
cause the centers were not willing, partly because they were not able to fulfill 
these political expectations. This resulted in a stage of discontent and disap-
pointment among the political actors at the beginning and then, in the 1980s, 
in a reaction which can be described as reduced expectations (Hohn/ Schi- 
mank 1990: 282-297). A political redefinition of Big Science took place; the 
political actors, especially the BMFT, no longer expected a technology transfer 
to industry and a strong orientation to application. Instead, they now projected 
the future of the centers in the area of long-term programs in the fields of 
health, environment and bioengineering. The National Research Centers sup-
ported this conceptual reorientation because it would enable them to conduct 
more basic research and to plan more reliably in the long term. Within this 
general political frame, the National Research Centers made their medium- 
and long-term plans during the 1980s. It is rather ironic that these plans were 
induced by political pressure from the BMFT and are now experiencing trou-
ble as a result of policy measures from the same ministry.
The specific directive issued by the BMFT to the National Research Cen-
ters in the “old” (i.e. western) federal states in 1991 was to reduce their per-
sonnel by 12% to 15% by 1994 (BMFT 1991). The BMFT enforced these 
reductions by freezing the budgets of the National Research Centers until 
1994. These budget cuts were accompanied by a catalog of additional political 
measures such as: an examination of the programmatic priorities of all centers, 
the elimination of redundancies in the research programs, and the encourage-
ment of more flexibility within the centers by a reduction in institutional 
promotion, by project funding, and by transforming vacant permanent posi-
tions into nonpermanent ones. It is quite obvious that the BMFT saw an op-
portunity to reduce costs in a research area it considered to be overfinanced 
in terms of institutional promotion. Why were the National Research Centers 
one of the main targets of budget cuts? As a group, the thirteen West German 
National Research Centers receive far more federal funding than any other 
branch of extrauniversity research. More than three billion DM are spent 
annually by these research organizations -  three times the amount the Max 
Planck Society receives from government sources. The National Research
242 Stucke
Centers receive 90% of their funding from the BMFT; some 30% percent of 
that ministry’s total budget is appropriated to their funding (BMFT 1991).
This trouble does not affect all National Research Centers equally. Repre-
sented by the Association of National Research Centers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Großforschung, AGF), the centers themselves demanded individual consider-
ation concerning budget cuts (KFA 090992; DLR 180892). From the begin-
ning, the AGF took the stance that proportional budget cuts for all centers 
without a careful assessment of their performance would harm the idea of 
National Research Centers in general (AGF 070593). This argument was then 
willingly adopted by the BMFT, which finally drew a distinction between 
three classes of National Research Centers to which different respective bud-
get restrictions would be applied (BMFT 1992). Four centers (three of which 
had been founded to conduct nuclear energy research) had to face real cut-
backs, five (e.g. the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt, 
DLR, the space science center) would have to do without any growth over 
the next years, and only four, devoted to life sciences, to the study of the 
earth, the oceans and the atmosphere, and to cancer research could expect 
any growth rates at all (e.g. the Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeres-
forschung and the Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum). By giving the BMFT 
the opportunity and legitimation for this strategy to “divide and conquer,” 
the National Research Centers -  unintentionally -  provoked a detailed and 
substantial evaluation by the BMFT which might cause new trouble or will 
aggravate the situation for some of the centers.
Under these preconditions, it is quite evident that collective and soli- 
daristic coping reactions of all centers are improbable. But coping will be 
difficult not only because the individual centers are affected differently by 
these policy measures. It will also be difficult because “trouble” does not 
mean the same thing at the different institutional levels of action. In the case 
of the National Research Centers, we have to distinguish between at least four 
levels of action, including different types of actors with various basic inter-
ests:
a. the individual level, comprising the individual researchers in the institutes 
concerned. Here, we have to consider about 6,100 scientists (in 1989) in 
thirteen West German National Research Centers, most of them in perma-
nent positions.
b. the group level, consisting of parts of institutes or of independent project 
groups. The size and degree of organization of these working units signifi-
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cant enough to be classified as “groups” vary substantially, so that it is 
difficult to delineate the exact difference between this level and the corpo-
rate level (described below) just by looking at an organizational chart.
c. the corporate level, made up of the institutes and the individual National 
Research Centers, is characterized by formal organization and hierarchical 
representation to the environment. The heads of the institutes are particu-
larly important at this level, as are the boards of directors and the man-
agement representing an entire National Research Center.
d. the association level, which has one actor, the Association of National 
Research Centers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Großforschung, AGF). The AGF 
has an office and a manager in Bonn, and a chairman elected by all of 
the National Research Centers. It is the explicit aim of the AGF to “repre-
sent the collective interests of the members externally” (AGF 1991: 9; 
translation by the author).
While these levels of Big Science are all, of course, interrelated, each is af-
fected very differently by political trouble. At the individual level, the individ-
ual researcher has to deal primarily with a threat to his career when his re-
search area is limited and resources are reduced. At the level of institutes and 
project groups, such trouble is primarily viewed as a threat to the groups’ 
competitive position with regard to other institutes and project groups outside 
the center. Here, the scientific community is the main reference group. This 
is not the decisive point at the corporate level, because a National Research 
Center integrates many institutes and many research programs. Rather, man-
agement faces the threat o f  a loss o f  integration and reputation with regard 
to other relevant actors (universities, industrial firms, ministries, etc). At this 
level, therefore, the main interest of a director is that the departments of his 
research center be considered “successful” (AGF 07051993) by the ministry 
and by industry. Finally, on the association level, the interests of the individ-
ual National Research Centers play a less important role; here, the actors are 
interested in defending the general idea of Big Science. Cutbacks and criti-
cism from the political actors always represent a threat that the model o f Big 
Science will be questioned in general.
With regard to these four levels of action, we can already observe differ-
ent coping strategies which are sometimes complementary and sometimes 
contradictory to each other. But it must be emphasized that these different 
ways of coping according to the respective levels of the actors are not only
244 Stucke
the result of certain “objective” problem situations demanding different reac-
tions from the actors; they are also caused by the strategic position of the 
actors, which predetermines specific perceptions and ways of information 
processing as well as potential means of coping. If we keep this in mind, we 
can understand why the corporate level predominates during the coping pro-
cesses. When the political trouble for the National Research Centers began 
as a result of actions by the BMFT, the individual National Research Center 
(and its management) was called on stage as the relevant corporate actor. 
Indeed, the budget cuts were first addressed by the BMFT to the top execu-
tives of the centers in May 1991 and it was seen as the task of the managing 
directors to inform their institutes and researchers.
There is another structural reason why the corporate level played a pivotal 
role and why it reacted promptly: Since specific formal positions determine 
action only at the top executive level of the organization, the institutes and 
researchers expect their management to be the first ones to cope with external 
trouble. This is also the case with regard to the association level, which is 
expected to maintain permanent contacts to the political actors. Hence, both 
the association and the corporate levels represent typical buffering functions, 
while institutes, groups and researchers make up the “technological core” 
(Thompson 1967: 19-24) of Big Science. Only later might the heads of insti-
tutes and individual researchers react, possibly to what they perceive as the 
“failure” of their management. When we compare the two buffering levels, 
we will observe a predominance of the corporate level over the association 
level. Empirically, the individual centers were the main recipients of informa-
tion about the political measures; as we will see, arriving at a collective inter-
est representation of all centers is a new step requiring several precon-
ditions.12
4 The Interplay between Coping Activities
As the top management o f  the centers were the first to receive information 
about imminent budget cuts by the BMFT in May of 1991, coping efforts
12 Concerning the improbability of collective coping reactions in general, cf. the concluding 
chapter by Schimank and Stucke in this volume.
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could first be observed at this level. But it is striking that in this early period 
of trouble the centers made no serious attempt to exercise their influence on 
the BMFT in order to prevent political interference. Considering the severe 
budget problems of the federal government and their own weak position, 
which still had to do with the nuclear energy image of Big Science in Germa-
ny, the top executives of the centers saw no real chance to avoid budget cuts. 
The managing directors of the centers, moreover, had no powerful allies: The 
other science organizations were their competitors for scarce resources, and 
the federal states with their 10% share of the financing of the centers had no 
real opportunity to influence the budget policy of the 90% financial backer 
(DLR 180892). Furthermore the federal states are always in an ambivalent 
position: On the one hand, they feel obliged to protect “their” centers; on the 
other, they see the necessity for a reform and even a reduction of the National 
Research Centers. It is this permanent conflict between science policy as 
research policy and science policy as regional policy which dominates the 
position of the federal states. In the case of Big Science, the states argue that 
a restructuring of this sector seems indeed desirable, but not as a result of 
an executive budget order by the federal government (WiMi 17071992). They 
joined the AGF in opposing the financial cutbacks, but their efforts were not 
very successful.
For that reason, with regard to the inner structure of his center, each man-
aging director only tried to minimize the undesirable consequences for his 
entire center as a corporate actor. On the one hand, the directors aimed to 
satisfy the political actors and to foster the integration and research identity 
of their center by preparing concepts to reduce personnel, to reorient programs 
and, sometimes, to restructure organization. On the other hand, they informed 
their institutes and employees early in mid-1991 about the approaching chang-
es in order to prevent inner conflicts and to gain acceptance for internal re-
structuring. At first, some of the centers considered it advantageous that the 
BMFT was only interested in achieving a general reduction in spending rather 
than at gaining substantial control over the implementation process. Surpris-
ingly, however, they then decided that letting themselves each be subjected 
to the same rate of reduction was unjustifiable. They thus opened “Pandora’s 
box,” eliciting a flurry of political control activities from the BMFT. It was 
the centers themselves that called upon the BMFT to provide a detailed con-
cept for its budget cuts which would take the specific needs and research 
outputs of the several centers into account. In autumn of 1991, the BMFT
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responded to this demand by developing a differentiated concept for the future 
of Big Science which distinguished between three classes of centers. In this 
way, as one managing director of a center put it (KFA 090992), the centers 
themselves supplied the BMFT with the “sharpened knife” for (possible) 
further cuts in the future which will lead to an unnecessary “exposure” and 
increasing competition between the centers.
But the unintended effect of the extended political control by the BMFT 
is not only due to the myopic, particularistic strategy of the individual centers 
trying to minimize their own losses at the expense of the other centers. This 
is reinforced by the strategic behavior on the associative level as well which 
demonstrates the peculiar structural position and role of the AGF. The AGF, 
founded in 1970 as a collective interest representation of the centers toward 
the political actors, could hardly fulfill this role over the last twenty years. 
This weakness is mainly due to the particularistic orientation of the various 
centers. Unlike the Max Planck Society or the Fraunhofer Society, the AGF 
represents heterogenous and, moreover, relatively autonomous research centers 
(with their own budgets). Therefore, we can expect particularistic coping 
efforts on the part of the centers to predominate rather than laborious attempts 
to come to a collective solution on the level of the AGF. At the association 
level, there is no executive authorized to pass binding decisions effective for 
the lower level of the individual research centers. The chair of the AGF is 
a member of the top management of one institute (at the moment the Manag-
ing Director of the DLR) who is elected for two years by representatives of 
all National Research Centers. In view of the “divide-and-conquer” concept 
of the BMFT, we cannot expect the AGF to find a common solution and 
formulate joint action with regard to these budget measures. What the AGF 
really did was to complain in general about the policy of the BMFT and to 
emphasize the value of the Big Science model for the future (AGF 11031992); 
it did not act collectively on behalf of the self-interests of one particular 
center. The AGF is not designed to fight, but rather to coordinate, as one 
managing director put it (KFA 090992). Consequently, the AGF supported 
a differentiated political treatment of the centers on the one hand, but denied 
the BMFT’s request to take part in the discussion about the programmatic 
and organizational reorientation of the centers (AGF 07051993) on the other. 
Since there are, in fact, influential voices calling for the “burial” of the model 
of Big Science (FAZ 1992), the aim to defend the raison d ’être of this type
German National Research Centers 247
of research organization appears to be an important coping effort on the asso-
ciation level.
The reference point for the institute or project group is its competitive 
position within the scientific community: The group concentrates on acquiring 
and maintaining the infrastructure and financial resources necessary for con-
tinuing innovative work. Its goals are sometimes undermined by the coping 
activities of the managing directors of the centers. Coping strategies of the 
National Research Centers (e.g. decisions executed by their top management) 
signaling to the political actors that the centers would be willing to implement 
internal reforms in certain program areas in order to survive as a whole defi-
nitely meant trouble for certain project groups. It is inevitable that the man-
agement of a National Research Center will sometimes be forced to hurt the 
interests of several of its institutes in order to maintain the strategic capacity 
of the whole organization.
One coping strategy at the group level was to oppose the internal redistri-
bution of resources if at all possible. The success of such a strategy depends 
on the relationship between the heads of the individual institutes and the 
management (Board of Directors) of the center. Since the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of a National Research Center is always appointed by the 
BMFT (a political decision from the top down), the influence of an institute 
on executive decisions will be probably low. Therefore, the only way the 
institutes can cope with internal cutbacks is to look for allies outside of the 
center (such as project groups at universities or other research organizations) 
or cooperative partners with whom they can share resources and equipment. 
The situation for the institutes is aggravated by the fact that they cannot re-
ceive any project grants from the BMFT (with the argument that this ministry 
is the main institutional promoter of Big Science) and that they receive only 
very limited project funds from the German Research Foundation, whose main 
task is supporting university research. The same holds true for the European 
community funds, which are relatively scarce in many program areas with 
respect to the number of applicants. Finally, the institutes are referred to 
research contracts in industry. Since the research conducted by many of the 
centers is not oriented closely enough to the research demands of industry, 
however, this coping strategy is also limited.
At the level of individual researchers, who are mainly interested in im-
proving their career options, we found three different coping patterns (GMD 
220792). The first one is exit, meaning that the researcher leaves the institute
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and goes to another scientific organization or to industry. This option can be 
used only by very few researchers who are young and flexible enough to be 
attractive for other research areas. Another individual option is “exit” in the 
sense that the researchers of a certain institute or project group leave their 
team and change to another project group or institute within the same Nation-
al Research Center. This option was used mainly in one National Research 
Center where the intraorganizational structure was totally changed.13 A third 
individual strategy is an example for “defensive coping,” that is, waiting for 
better times, which means continuing with one’s own work and hoping that 
political priorities will change again in the near future.
These multilevel coping constellations now become even more complex 
if we consider the unintended side effects the action on one specific level will 
have on the other levels of action (possibly causing a new type of trouble). 
To give two examples of such interdependencies: The exit option at the level 
of the individual researchers, for example, leads inevitably to a brain drain 
in an institute or a project group, and in turn affects the respective coping 
strategies at this respective institutional level negatively. The institutes or 
project groups therefore lose their micropolitical power vis-à-vis the manage-
ment of the National Research Center or are no longer attractive cooperation 
partners for groups outside the center. On the other hand, these side effects 
may be regarded positively by a particular center because it may support the 
policy of the top management to reorganize or even close certain constituent 
institutes.
Another example may serve to illustrate this point. The policy of adapta-
tion on the part of a National Research Center (i.e. willingness of the center’s 
top management to fulfill some of the BMFT’s expectations in order to sur-
vive as a whole) will inevitably lead to the delegitimation of some research 
areas, institutes and project groups. In effect, these areas will be “sacrificed” 
by top management. Obviously, this coping strategy and its side effect, the 
delegitimation, will have negative consequences for the coping strategies of 
the institutes or project groups within the center: If they are delegitimated 
by their own management, it is hardly conceivable that they will still find
13 Under the condition that none of the new institutes will acquire any additional positions 
for scientists it is rational for them to accept all applications from members of those 
institutes which are subject to cuts by political measures.
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cooperation partners outside the center. Their means of coping are therefore 
restricted by the coping activities of the higher level.
Figure 1: Interplay Between Coping and Trouble on Different Levels of Action
unwillingness/ 




stepwise chain of coping
researcher
(successful) coping 
on the lower 
level stepwise chain of trouble
So far, on the basis of empirical observation, we recognize the first symptoms 
of trouble, particularly at the individual and at the institute level caused by 
coping activities at the corporate level. But these symptoms might indicate 
a general pattern and a specific dynamic of coping and trouble throughout 
the different levels of action in the future (cf. Figure 1). From a higher to 
a lower level of action (association, center, institute, researcher), we can 
observe a stepwise chain of coping which activates the coping efforts at the 
lower level because of the failure or unwillingness of the next-higher level. 
Since the AGF fails to represent the collective interests of all members, each 
center chooses a particularistic coping strategy. But if this corporate coping 
is not successful or adequate from the point of view of the next-lower level 
of the institutes or project groups, the actors there have to launch their own 
coping efforts in order to guarantee the continuation of their research. Finally, 
if the institute’s coping cannot guarantee the career interests of its researchers,
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these researchers will react individually to the threat to their professional 
future.14
If these different coping reactions at the different levels do, in fact, take 
place, we have an interesting example for a stepwise chain of trouble in the 
upward direction. For if there are some successful coping activities at the 
individual level (e.g. “exit” of the best scientists to other institutes), this will 
reinforce the trouble at the next-higher level because the institutes lose the 
very personnel necessary for the success of coping strategies such as arrang-
ing for cooperation with prestigious institutes or applying for project grants. 
But if, however, some institutes are successful -  for example in buffering the 
reorganization plans of the management of the center -  this may cause new 
trouble on the next-higher corporate level because the center management 
is demonstrating a lack of authority in implementing reforms and thereby 
satisfying the political actors. Finally, the centers which succeed with their 
particularistic strategy of minimizing their own losses at the expense of the 
other centers directly produce a delegitimation of the AGF and, in this way, 
a new (reactive) trouble which harms the scope of action on the association 
level.
In conclusion, we see that multilevel constellations play a pivotal role in 
the institutional perspective on science. Up to now, we often had analyses 
and theoretical concepts which concentrated on one of these levels. In the 
future, it might be fruitful to pay more attention to the interdependence of 
these different levels combined with a dynamic perspective on science, to 
show how actions and the interference of actions will cause structural effects, 
in turn causing new intentions and actions. In this way, we may also gain 
more insight into the scope and limits of political action in science.15
14 That means that there is sequential log ic  of coping actions. This does not exclude coping 
activities which occur sim ultaneously  on the different levels of action, possibly because 
actors on a lower level anticipate the failure of the next higher level. But often we can 
assume that lower-level actors expect coping reactions primarily from the higher-level 
actors, who are thought to have greater organizational capacities to act strategically.
15 As Uwe Schimank and I have attempted to do; cf. the concluding chapter in this volume.
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